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ABSTRACT1 
We present HoloPass, a mixed reality application for the HoloLens wearable device, which allows 
users to perform user authentication tasks through gesture-based interaction. In particular, this 
paper reports the implementation of picture passwords for mixed reality environments, and 
highlights the development procedure, lessons learned from common design and development 
issues, and how they were addressed. It further reports a between-subjects study (N=30) which 
compared usability, security, and likeability aspects of picture passwords in mixed reality vs. 
traditional desktop contexts aiming to investigate and reason on the viability of picture passwords 
as an alternative user authentication approach for mixed reality. This work can be of value for 
enhancing and driving future implementations of picture passwords in mixed reality since initial 
results are promising towards following such a research line. 
                                                                
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee 
provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the 
full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, 
contact the Owner/Author. 
 
CHI'19 Extended Abstracts, May 4–9, 2019, Glasgow, Scotland UK 
© 2019 Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). 
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5971-9/19/05. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3290607.3313076 
CHI 2019 Late-Breaking Work  CHI 2019, May 4–9, 2019, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
LBW0263, Page 1
KEYWORDS 
Knowledge-based User Authentication; Picture 
Passwords; Mixed Reality; Implementation; 
Feasibility Study. 
 
Figure 1: Example of Microsoft Windows 10 
Picture Gesture Authentication on a traditional 
desktop computer. 
 
 
Figure 2: User interacting with HoloPass that 
resembles PGA in mixed reality. 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Mixed reality technologies embrace hand gesture-based interaction modalities which can be 
leveraged by picture passwords, as they require users to draw secret gestures on a background 
image. However up to date, user authentication tasks in popular mixed reality technologies, such 
as Microsoft HoloLens, solely deploy text passwords which is known to depreciate usability, since 
hand gesture-based text input in a virtual keyboard is a difficult and time demanding task [21, 22]. 
Picture passwords have been introduced as alternative user authentication schemes for 
providing a fluid login experience on desktop computers and tablets, however, little attention has 
been given so far to investigate such schemes in mixed reality contexts. A widely deployed picture 
password is Microsoft Windows 10 Picture Gesture Authentication (PGA) (Figure 1) [1, 12]. PGA is 
an instance of background draw-a-secret schemes - BDAS [2] (see [3] on a review on popular 
picture password schemes, e.g., BDAS [2], DAS [4], PassPoints [5]). 
Recent works on user authentication have explored alternative schemes in mixed and virtual 
reality contexts, including [6] that investigated three different authentication mechanisms in 
virtual reality such as 3D patterns, 2D sliding patterns and pin-based authentication; [7] that 
discussed users’ personal views on sharing QR codes between a physical display and an HMD to 
authenticate applications; [8] that adapted two traditional authentication schemes (pin- and 
pattern-based) in virtual reality; [9] that introduced two pin-based mechanisms on Google Glass; 
and [10] that introduced a biometric system to analyze the bone conduction of sound through the 
user’s skull on Google Glass to identify and authenticate the user. 
The aforementioned schemes and current password or pin-based schemes seem not be adequate 
in such contexts since research has shown that text input in a virtual keyboard hinders usability 
[21, 22]. Hence, we believe that background draw-a-secret schemes in mixed reality is a research 
line that is worth investigation. In this paper, we report on the first implementation of a picture 
password scheme for mixed reality environments, and highlight the development procedure and 
lessons learned. We further report on a user study which compared usability, security, and 
likeability aspects of picture passwords in mixed reality vs. desktop contexts to investigate the 
viability of picture passwords as an alternative user authentication approach for mixed reality. 
 
2 IMPLEMENTATION OF PICTURE PASSWORDS FOR MIXED REALITY 
HoloPass is a mixed reality application that utilizes the Microsoft HoloLens device to allow users 
to directly interact with picture-based holograms in order to perform user authentication tasks. 
The current prototype was developed in Unity 3D, using C# and Microsoft’s Mixed Reality Toolkit 
for HoloLens, and follows implementation guidelines of Microsoft Windows 10 PGA [12] in which 
users draw three secret gestures (dots, lines, circles) on a background image that acts as a cue 
(Figure 1). HoloPass implements the following user authentication tasks: i) picture password 
creation; ii) user login; and iii) picture password reset. In each task, the screen is split in two sides 
(Figure 2). The left side illustrates instructions about the task and status of activity, and the right 
side illustrates the background image on which users indicate their password by drawing three 
secret gestures. The high-level architecture of HoloPass is depicted in Figure 3. 
CHI 2019 Late-Breaking Work  CHI 2019, May 4–9, 2019, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
LBW0263, Page 2
  
Figure 3: HoloPass high-level architecture. Users 
perform gestures to draw secret patterns on the 
background image (dot, line, circle) which are 
processed and stored for verification in the 
system’s database. 
 
        
Figure 4: User input through hand gestures (left) or 
using the HoloLens clicker (right) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gesture Data Analysis Module. Three gestures were implemented, i.e., dot, line, circle which 
can be achieved through hand-based gestures or clicker-based gestures (Figure 4). For implementing 
hand-based gestures, we used Microsoft Toolkit’s Manipulation events which allow full control over 
the position of the hand in each frame, and whether the user is performing a tap or hold gesture. 
For implementing clicker-based gestures, we used Microsoft Toolkit’s Navigation events which 
returns the magnitude of the user’s interaction using the clicker with a normalized range [-1, 1] 
which is translated into a global position using Unity’s built-in functions (e.g., OnNavigationStarted, 
OnNavigationUpdated, OnNavigationCompleted). Based on initial user feedback with early 
prototypes of the system, users rated the clicker as more usable than hand gestures, since the 
clicker does not interfere with the user’s field of view during interaction and requires less hand 
movements for capturing a gesture. 
The dot gesture was implemented by capturing the users’ tap (either through hand or click) at 
the position where they focus. The line gesture was implemented by capturing the start and end 
position of the line. To start drawing a line, users first tap-and-hold on the starting position (this 
way we can initiate the line gesture and differentiate it from the dot gesture), and then move their 
hand or clicker to the end position. When the desired end position is reached, users release their 
finger or clicker to register the line gesture. Finally, to initiate the circle gesture and differentiate it 
from the dot and line gestures, we implemented a double-tap-and-hold mechanic using coroutines 
and timers. When users double tap and hold the second tap, they can control the circle radius by 
moving their hand to the left or right with the center of the circle being the users’ gaze position. 
For processing gestures, we calculate a transparent grid of the image containing 100 segments 
on the longest side, and then dividing the shortest side by the same scale. This approach allows 
storing the gestures based on their segment position on the grid rather than pixel coordinates. 
 
Alternative Implementation of Gestures. An alternative implementation of gestures was 
based using Microsoft’s Custom Vision AI, an online machine learning service, that enables 
building, deploying and improving custom image classifiers. For detecting hand gestures, when a 
user performs a tap-and-hold to form a line or a circle, the application draws on a sprite, the 
positions of the user’s hand in each frame. The sprite is then sent to the Custom Vision AI API to 
classify the user’s hand gesture. However, this method needs further investigation, since it requires 
continuous connection to the API, and training to create credible models to limit misclassifications. 
 
3 EVALUATION STUDY 
The following research question was examined: Are PGAs a good alternative and viable 
authentication solutions for mixed reality contexts? For doing so, we designed an in-lab study in 
which participants used a picture password similar to PGA. Specifically, we investigated usability 
aspects of PGA in mixed reality in terms of task execution and likeability, and security in terms of 
guessing attacks. In addition, we have compared these metrics with a traditional desktop version of 
PGA in order to compare whether the technology shift affects the factors under investigation.  
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Figure 5: Background image used as a cue for the 
picture password. 
3.1 Null Hypotheses 
H01. There is no significant difference in the time needed to create a picture password between 
users that utilize a mixed reality device vs. a desktop computer; 
H02. There is no significant difference in strength of user-generated picture passwords between 
users that utilize a mixed reality device vs. a desktop computer; 
H03. There is no general preference of users towards picture- or text-based passwords, 
considering main effects and interactions with respect to device used (mixed reality vs. desktop). 
 
3.2 Sampling and Procedure 
A total of 30 participants were recruited (10 females), in the age range of 22 to 40 (m=31.7; 
sd=6.1). No participant was familiar with picture passwords and all had no or limited prior 
experience with mixed reality devices. Following a between-subjects design, we formed two groups; 
half of the participants interacted with the picture password in HoloLens (Mixed Reality Group), 
and the other half with a traditional desktop-based PGA (Desktop Group). Considering that image 
complexity affects password strength [17] and gesture combinations [18, 19], we provided the 
same image (Figure 5) to keep image complexity the same across users. 
The study involved the following steps: i) participants were informed that the collected data 
would be stored anonymously for research purposes, and they signed a consent form; ii) they were 
familiarized with the picture password, HoloLens and clicker-based gestures; iii) participants then 
created a picture password to unlock a real service in order to increase ecological validity; iv) they 
were asked to log in to ensure that the passwords were not created at random; and finally v) they 
interacted with a text password deployed through a (virtual) keyboard and were further asked to 
choose their preferred authentication type (picture vs. text password). 
 
3.3 Data Metrics  
We measured the following data for each group: i) time required to create the picture password; 
ii) guessability of user-generated picture passwords which represents the number of guesses 
required to crack a password (following common brute-force attack approaches [1, 20]); and iii) 
likeability through semi-structured interviews and questionnaires. 
 
3.4 Analysis of Results and Main Findings 
In the analysis that follows, data are mean ± standard error. There were no significant outliers. 
Table 1 summarizes the creation times and guessability. Figure 6 depicts user preference. 
 
Differences in Picture Password Creation Time. To investigate H01, we ran an independent-
samples t-test, with the user group (mixed reality vs. desktop) as the independent variable, and the 
time to create the picture password as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed that password 
creation times between the two groups were not significant (Mixed Reality: 16.69 sec vs. Desktop: 
12.88 sec) with a mean difference of 3.81 ± 3.02 seconds (95% CI, -1.39 to 10.01), t(27)=1.261, p=.218. 
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 Table 1: Password creation times and guessability 
per user group. 
 Creation time 
(sec) 
Guessability 
(billion) 
Mixed Reality 16.69 (10.5) 306 (7) 
Desktop 12.88 (4.96) 310 (1.1) 
 
 
Figure 6: User authentication preference per user 
group. 
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Differences in Picture Password Strength. To investigate H02 and contextualize the usability 
results, we have further run an independent-samples t-test to investigate whether the two user 
groups generated different password strengths. Results revealed no significant differences with a 
mean difference of 4.69 ± 3 billion guesses (95% CI, -1.08 to 1.47), t(27)=-1.562, p=.130. In particular, 
user-chosen picture passwords of the Mixed Reality Group required 306 billion guesses to crack, 
and those of the Desktop Group required 310 billion guesses to crack. 
 
User Preference related to Authentication Type. To investigate H03, we conducted a chi-
square test for association between device type and preference towards authentication type 
(picture vs. text passwords). All expected cell frequencies were greater than five. There was a 
statistically significant association between device type and authentication type preference, 
χ2(1)=8.571, p=.003. Participants that interacted within mixed reality significantly chose the picture 
password as their preferred authentication method (p<.001). Participants interacting on the 
desktop computer significantly preferred traditional text passwords (p<.001) which can be 
explained due to familiarity. Figure 7 summarizes some representative user comments received at 
the end of the study. 
 
To this end, results revealed that the differences in password creation times and number of 
guesses required to crack the passwords were not significantly different between the two user 
groups. Considering that participants had no prior experience with mixed reality devices, such a 
result is promising towards further investigating picture passwords for mixed reality since picture 
password interactions are not depreciated when deployed in such contexts. In addition, qualitative 
feedback received at the end of the study revealed a strong positive preference of users towards 
using picture passwords when these are deployed in mixed reality. 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presented the implementation and initial evaluation of a picture password scheme 
for mixed reality. Such an attempt, to the best of our knowledge, is the first of its kind aiming to 
investigate whether picture passwords are suitable within such contexts. While results based on 
initial in-lab evaluation studies are promising, further studies are required to evaluate picture 
passwords in real-life mixed reality contexts to get further insights on security and memorability 
aspects, and user acceptance. 
Given that mixed reality has already entered the market and end-users will continue to use such 
devices to authenticate themselves, it becomes evident that the current widely deployed text 
password paradigm might soon become obsolete. Hence, we believe that approaches like picture 
passwords provide an alternative solution to current state-of-the-art research in mixed reality and 
have the potential to be adopted within nowadays ubiquitous computation realms. 
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 Figure 7: Users’ comments received at the end of 
the study. 
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“It is much easier to draw my password than using 
the virtual keyboard.” ~ P24 
 
“I liked the variety of gestures and the ease of their 
creation.” ~ P07 
 
"In the beginning it was quite hard because it is my 
first time but with more practice, I could create a 
password in no time" ~ P16 
 
"It is a more creative way to create a password and 
escapes the dullness of the keyboard" ~ P30 
 
"I really like the freedom I have with moving my 
hand in order to create the gesture" - P01 
 
"I found drawing circles difficult because of the 
accuracy of the center" - P02 
 
"The most difficult part was finding where to draw 
the gestures but I believe that adds up to the 
security of the password" - P15 
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